This paper studies the ∞  disturbance attenuation problem for index one descriptor systems using the theory of differential games. To solve this disturbance attenuation problem the problem is converted into a reduced ordinary zero-sum game. Within a linear quadratic setting the problem is solved for feedback information structure.
Introduction
The disturbance attenuation problem is an important issue in many practical applications since all practical control systems are subject to disturbances. Any form of disturbance is always detrimental to systems. Therefore, one of the biggest problems faced by a control designer is to design a controller that is capable to overcome various form of disturbances that might arise in the system [11] . One of the techniques to solve a disturbance attenuation problem uses a differential game approach [1] , [2] , and [14] . In this disturbance attenuation framework the control designer is the minimizing agent. They fight against disturbances or uncertainties which are represented by the maximizing agent.
The main problem discussed in this paper is how to solve the disturbance attenuation problem by designing a robust optimal control, using a differential game approach, for descriptor systems that have index one, assuming a feedback information framework. [1] used this approach to find robust controllers for regular systems (nonsingular systems). In [21] the feedback zero-sum linear quadratic soft-constrained descriptor differential game for index one systems was solved by transforming it into a regular differential game. Following this same procedure, the robust control design problem for descriptor systems can also be translated into a regular differential game. Hence, by merging results obtained in [1] and [21] , we will solve the robust optimal control problem for descriptor systems here. Further, [20] solved this problem for an open-loop information framework.
Compared to the frequency-domain formulation the addressed technique, which is a time-domain approach, has the advantage that it allows one to formulate also finite planning horizon and time-varying versions of the problem, and thus also study the transient behavior [1] , [18] . Moreover, the addressed technique seems to be the simplest and the most intuitive one, since after all the original robust optimal control problem is a minimax optimization control problem and hence a zero-sum game.
As already noted above, in this paper we consider the disturbance attenuation problem under the assumption that the dynamics of the underlying process are described by a descriptor system that has index one. Descriptor systems model static as well as dynamic constraints of a real plant using sets of coupled differential and algebraic equations. Applications of descriptor systems can be found in chemical processes [13] , circuit systems [23, 24] , economic systems [16] , large-scale interconnected systems [17, 28] , mechanical engineering systems [9] , power systems [27] , and robotics [19] .
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the precise problem formulation of designing a disturbance attenuation problem by designing a robust optimal control using the differential game approach and translates the problem for a descriptor system into a regular differential game. Section 3 recalls from [21] the feedback zero-sum linear quadratic soft-constrained descriptor differential game for both a finite planning horizon and an infinite planning horizon. Section 4 presents the main result for the problem. We discuss the solution for the disturbance attenuation problem for both a finite and infinite planning horizon. At last, section 6 will conclude.
Problem statement
We consider in this paper the dynamical system
= , 0 = = =
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Here A 1 is a matrix in Jordan form whose elements are the finite eigenvalues, System (1) is said to be of index one 1 if N = 0 (its degree of nilpotency is one). Next, recall from, e.g., [8] that for all initial states in (1) there exists a smooth control that generates a smooth state trajectory if and only if (1) is impulse controllable 2 . Further, all impulsive modes of (1) can be transformed then into finite dynamic modes using static state feedback control. Since we do not want to consider impulsive control actions in this paper we restrict our attention to impulse controllable systems. As we consider the state feedback control problem, this motivates why we may assume for our problem, without loss of generality, that the system (1) has index one. The above discussion motivates then the next assumptions.
Assumption 1.
We use the following assumptions throughout this paper:
Assume the transfer function for the system (1) is 11 12 21 22 := . 
for the dynamical system (1) then the cost function (5) can be represented in a quadratic form,
T T T J u w x t Qx t u t R u t w t R w t dt
Here . The game defined by (1,7) is called the (zero-sum) soft-constrained differential game. This terminology is used to capture the feature that in this game there is no hard bound with respect to w [1] . In this closedloop game framework we assume that the controls given by both players are in linear feedback control form defined by
where
is a piecewise continuous function and ( ) ( ) , u t w t depend only on the current state of the systems and time. So, for a fixed γ , the robust control design problem reduces to finding the optimal controller
t Qx t u t R u t w t R w t dt
subject to dynamical equation (1) .
Following the procedure in [21] , yields that ( ) * * , u w is a Feedback Saddle Point (FBSP) solution for the zero-sum differential game (1) with cost function (7) if and only if ( ) 
where 1 1 11 12 
= X X X are nonsingular matrices as defined in (2) and
. The cost function for the control designer is
In the Appendix we provided an adequate explanation about the transformation from descriptor differential game (1,7) into a regular reduced differential game (10, 11) , as well as the spellings of the matrices defined in (12).
The feedback zero-sum linear quadratic soft-constrained descriptor differential game
In this section we recall some theorems of feedback zero-sum linear quadratic softconstrained differential games for index one descriptor systems from [21] that will be used as a framework in designing robust optimal controls. We will characterize the set of FBSP solutions for the game (1,7) using the reduced ordinary differential game described by the dynamical system (10) with the cost function (11) . The general index case was studied in [25] , where the theory of projector chains is used to decouple algebraic and differential parts of the descriptor system, and then the usual theory of ordinary differential games is applied to derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of feedback Nash equilibria for linear quadratic differential games. Furthermore, the open-loop version of such a game has been studied in [22] , while the hard constrained version for such games can be found in [26] and [30] . We assume that the players act non-cooperatively and the information they have is the present state and the model structure.
In addition to linear feedback control in the form of equation (8), in this section we also restrict the controller in the sense that it must stabilize the system for all consistent initial states. As discussed in [5] we assume that the feedback matrix F belongs to the set ( ) ( ) 
We assume that the matrix pairs ( )
, are stabilizable. So, in principle, each player is capable to stabilize the first part of the transformed system on his own. Furthermore, to ensure that such a stabilizing control for player one is generated naturally through the solution (optimization) process, unstable modes of 1 A will have to be observable through Q  . So, we make the assumption that the pair = 0.
. Furthermore, to ensure the ARE above has a solution, we introduce the following nonempty set
and J γ denotes the upper value of the game. Then, applying Theorem 3 in [5] (16) has no conjugate point in a giv- = . 
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are both asymptotically stable.
is the unique solution of (14) in the class of nonnegative definite matrices which make 1 CL A stable.
8. Since ( ) (14) we arrive at the standard algebraic Riccati equation that arises in linear regulator theory for descriptor systems (see also [1] page 142 for the ordinary game) (
= 0.
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Let 0 + Σ ≥  denote its maximal solution. We are now in a position to state the following theorem (For a proof we refer to Theorem 4.8' in [1] 
For all > CL
γ γ ∞ , the two matrices (20) and (21) 
Disturbance attenuation problem
To eliminate the effect of disturbances on the system one can to provide a robust controller for the system. References and related issues of such problems for descriptor systems can be found in, e.g. [29] , [10] and [15] .
We consider in this section the ∞  disturbance attenuation problem, i.e., the problem to find an admissible controller 
T T T u U w L s x t Qx t u t R u t w t R w t dt
or, equivalently, ( ) ( )
subject to dynamical equation (1) with ( )
. We will present the solution to this problem that follows from the solution of the corresponding soft-constrained game considered in the previous section under the assumption that 22 
From Theorem 2 we know that for every > CL γ γ ∞ the soft-constrained differential game has a FBSP solution where the minimizing controller is denoted by ( ) ( )
. Furthermore, because of the existence of a conjugate point to RDE (16)
may not be well-defined. Hence in this paper we will only consider the suboptimal solution. To that end, let > 0 ε be sufficiently small and define := CL ε γ γ ε ∞ + . Considering the fact above and applying Theorem 3 in [5] and also Theorem 2, Theorem 3 to the problem (1,23) above results in the following theorem (see also Theorem 4.11 in [1] for the nonsingular game). 
Theorem 4 Consider the robust suboptimal control design (disturbance attenuation) problem (1,23) with feedback information structure and
Here the robust suboptimal controller that achieves this bound is ( ) ( )
, and ( )
where K γ ε + is the unique nonnegative definite solution of the ARE (14) . Furthermore, for any > 0 ε , * u γ ε ∞ leads to a bounded input bounded state stable system.
If the detectability assumption is replaced by where K γ ε + is the nonnegative definite solution of ARE (14) . Therefore, from Theorem 2 item 3, the differential game (1,7) satisfies
Since the game uses a feedback information framework, it is easily verified that . (26) holds. Next, because for > ε γ γ the game admits FBSP solutions then the robust suboptimal controller follows from Theorem 2 part 2. Further, since K γ ε + exists, using the results in part 5 of Theorem 2, the suboptimal robust controller then follows from (17) and (18) . Finally, applying Theorem 3 to the problem (1,23) yields the last statement of Theorem 4. □
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Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the robust optimal control problem for descriptor systems. Some theorems dealing with the problem have been constructed both on a finite and infinite planning horizon. The paper shows how the soft-constrained differential game formulation can be used to solve the disturbance attenuation problem and the key role played by the critical values CL γ ∞ . The problem addressed in this paper is primarily restricted to the feedback information structure. An extension to other information structures, like delayed and sampleddata systems, and the case that the system is not perfect-state measurable seem to be interesting topics too, but this is an open problem left for future research.
Appendix. Transformation of the differential game
First, we state the following two lemmas that will be used in transforming the differential game. The first lemma can be found in [6] . 
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With the cost function preferred to be minimized by the first player ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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and for the second player ( )
, where
y t ∈  , and ( ) q z t ∈  . By Weierstrass' canonical form (see e.g. [7] ) there exists two nonsingular matrices X and Y such that
Under the index one assumption, with
where ( ) 
where the first player has the quadratic cost functional ( ) 
T T T T T x t J u w x t x t X QX u t R u t w t R w t dt x t
From (33) we use Lemma 1 for the infinite planning horizon to show that 
